Each contributor to this book has used personal experience as the basis from which to frame his individual sociological perspectives. Because they have personalized their work, their accounts are real, and recognizable as having come from 'real' persons, about 'real' experiences. There are no objectively-distanced disembodied third person entities in these accounts. These writers are actual people whose stories will make you laugh, cry, think, and want to know more.

Azerbaijanis living in the Republic of Azerbaijan and practicing Islam are part of the Muslim world. After gaining independence, our country restored and developed our national-cultural and religious traditions. The great services of the great leader Heydar Aliyev are undeniable in our successes in the field of strengthening these values. As a result of his policies and recommendations, our young people are loyal to their national roots and moral values. These are important factors for Azerbaijani youth to succeed in life (...) and live in peace and tranquility. Also, one of the main directions of Heydar Aliyev's policy was to effectively use universal, worldly values, to combine them with our national-spiritual, religious values and to enrich the spirituality of our people as a whole. His main goal in this way was to properly promote tolerance, our national culture and religious values to the youth of Azerbaijan. Thus, the people of Azerbaijan, besides belonging to the Islamic civilization, also live universal, tolerant and multicultural values. Azerbaijan, which takes the path of democratic, legal and secular state-building and steps confidently towards a bright future in this direction, stands out in the Islamic world for its uniqueness. All this, the preservation of national and moral values, instilling them in the young generation was of special importance, which the National leader duly performed. In order to prevent drug addiction, criminality, immorality, boredom, and moral and spiritual laziness, which have become the scourge of the times, the teaching and propagation of Islam is extremely important, and the work being done in this field in Azerbaijan is a continuation of Heydar Aliyev's policy. The salvation of faith and beliefs, the education of perfect, healthy moral, brave, truth-loving, and fair young people depends on the correct teaching of the Islamic religion, which Heydar Aliyev tried and achieved to some extent during his time in power. (shrink)

Philosophers and linguists alike tend to call a semantic theory ‘Russellian’ just in case it assigns to sentences in which definite descriptions occur the truth-conditions Russell did in ‘On Denoting’. This is unfortunate; not all aspects of those particular truth-conditions do explanatory work in Russell's writings. As far as the semantics of descriptions is concerned, the key insights of ‘On Denoting’ are that definite descriptions are not uniformly referring expressions, and that they are scope-bearing elements. Anyone who accepts these two (...) claims can account for Russell's puzzle cases the way he did. Russell had no substantive argument for the claim that ‘The F is G’ entails ‘There is at most one F’; in fact, he had important misgivings about it. I outline an argument against this claim, and I argue that by holding on to uniqueness contemporary semanticists make a momentous mistake: they keep the illusion alive that there is a way to account for linguistic meaning without addressing what linguistic expressions are for. (shrink)

The discussion centres around two issues: the issue of meaning, and the question whether the tools of rhetoric viewed as the basic tool in interpersonal communication can be helpful in reading and interpreting meaning. The author understands meaning after G. Frege: […] let the following phraseology be established: A proper name expresses its sense, stands for or designates its reference. By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference. The purpose of the discussion is also to (...) answer a much more general question: whether through rhetoric can one say something important about the world, so do they define a philosophical thesis or only, from various perspectives, one searches for the most probable answer to a hypothesis. The presented assumption is a result of the suggestion of Willard van Orman Quine: Rhetoric is the literary technology of persuasion, for good or ill, and it entails something which Randal Marlin defined as referentially translucent expressions. Therefore, the hypothesis I shall try to prove is the following: can the sense of any expression be, using the tools of rhetoric, defined to such an extent so that it becomes a philosophical thesis and not a hypothesis? So that in terms of both the subject and the object the expression could be considered as true. Then and only then can one say that such an expression has/contains some sense. (shrink)

Context: Affective neuroscience has not developed first-person methods for the generation of first-person data. This neglect is problematic, because emotion experience is a central dimension of affectivity. Problem: I propose that augmenting affective neuroscience with a neurophenomenological method can help address long-standing questions in emotion theory, such as: Do different emotions come with unique, distinctive patterns of brain and bodily activity? How do emotion experience, bodily feelings and brain and bodily activity relate to one another? Method: This paper is (...) theoretical. It advances ideas for integrating neurophenomenology and affective neuroscience, and explains how this integration would allow progress on the above questions. Results: An integrated “affective neuro-physio-phenomenology” may help scientists understand whether discrete emotion categories come in different experiential varieties, which would in turn help interpret concomitant brain and bodily activity. It may also help investigate the bodily nature of emotion experience, including how experience relates to actual brain and bodily activity. Implications: If put into practice, the ideas advanced here would enrich the scientific study of emotion experience and more generally further our understanding of the relationship of consciousness and physical activity. The paper is speculative and its ideas need to be implemented to bear fruit. Constructivist content: This paper argues in favor of the neurophenomenological method, which is an offshoot of enactivism. (shrink)

An engaging argument about what experimental music can tell us about being human. -/- In Experimenting the Human, G Douglas Barrett argues that experimental music speaks to the contemporary posthuman, a condition in which science and technology decenter human agency amid the uneven temporality of postwar global capitalism. Time moves forward for some during this period, while it seems to stand still or even move backward for others. Some say we’re already posthuman, while others endure the extended consequences of never (...) having been considered fully human in the first place. Experimental music reflects on this state, Barrett contends, through its interdisciplinary involvements in postwar science, technology, and art movements. -/- Rather than pursuing the human’s beyond, experimental music addresses the social and technological conditions that support such a pursuit. Barrett locates this tendency of experimentalism throughout its historical entanglements with cybernetics, and in his intimate analysis of Alvin Lucier’s neurofeedback music, Pamela Z’s BodySynth performances, Nam June Paik’s musical robotics, Pauline Oliveros’s experiments with radio astronomy, and work by Laetitia Sonami, Yasunao Tone, and Jerry Hunt. Through a unique meeting of music studies, media theory, and art history, Experimenting the Human provides fresh insights into what it means to be human. (shrink)

Philosophers traditionally have tried to establish general principles on solid grounding that would validly state and clarify what actually happens and what should happen in a polis. Infrequently, they sullied their hands with attempts to apply their general principles to specific, complex, time-bound, exigent, controversial situations. Now, however, numbers of professional philosophers have turned to the difficult task of applying broad generalizations to thorny issues of the day. Eleven attempts to carry out that task—essays on reform, principled law-breaking, violence, revolution, (...) and the responsibilities of philosophers vis-à-vis public affairs—are included in the present volume. Noam Chomsky, in an essay on philosophers and public policy, wistfully describes as having "a great deal of force," and then rejects, the argument that the only duty of a philosopher qua philosopher, in a time of turmoil, is to do his work with integrity. Of the essays on civil disobedience, one by Gordon J. Schochet critically examines, and in the end comes close to defending once more, the often-defended assumption that the practitioner of civil disobedience should accept the standard penalty. These eleven essays are partisan and practical in that, instead of examining the presuppositions or meaning or bearing of political judgments or ideologies, they present and vigorously support specific judgments, mostly unorthodox judgments, about political issues. This is a distinctly useful and needed book; but more clarification should be forthcoming on the extent to which philosophers as philosophers should take stands on political controversies.—W. G. (shrink)

The business community of Canada manifests questionable moral and ethical standards in its criticism of government spending, since it itself bears considerable responsibility for the increase in government spending and budget deficits. The contradiction arises from the failure of the business community to recognize the liberalization of society at large and the associated social responsibility for the well-being of its citizens; a well-being manifested in income maintenance programmes, in access to education and training, in health care, and others. The failure (...) to recognize such expectations is manifested in its failure to provide adequately for the retirement of its employees, for the health care of its employees, for laid-off and seperated employees, thereby shifting the burden to government. Further, it has failed to assume responsibility for the training and retraining of the workers it employs, including high-level workers trained specifically to its purposes in business schools. While expecting government to bear full financial responsibility for income maintenance, health, education and training, the business community makes every effort to deny government the revenues it needs to meet its obligations. The avoidance of tax payments stands high amongst business objectives, manifested in the employment of highly paid accountants and tax lawyers specifically for the purpose. Finally, in their criticism of government spending, business spokesmen deliberately fail to distinguish between consumption spending and capital investment spending, notwithstanding the significant contribution to the production infrastructure of the economy of government investment expenditures. If the capital expenditures were to be taken out of the government's budget, the deficit will decrease substantially. (shrink)

Advances in genetics and genomics have raised new questions in trout restoration and management, specifically about species identity and purity, which fish to value, and where these fish belong. This paper examines how this molecular turn in fisheries management is influencing wild and native trout policy in Colorado. Examples from two small Colorado watersheds, Bear Creek and Sand Creek, illustrate how framing trout as genetic bodies can guide managers to care for or kill trout populations in the interest of (...) rectifying decades of genetic disruption caused by human activity. While trout management has typically relied on human intervention, the turn to genetic science is prompting new classifications of lineage and taxa, altering long-standing conservation priorities, and reorienting the manipulation of biological processes such as reproduction and dispersal. As a result, other social and ecological factors may be pushed to the margins of management decisions. These changes warrant greater conversation about the consequences of molecular analyses and the values embedded in trout science and conservation more broadly. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Criminal Law, Pain Relief, and Physician Aid in DyingFaye Girsh, Ed.D., Executive DirectorMadam:The article by Cantor and Thomas on “Pain Relief, Acceleration of Death, and Criminal Law” (KIEJ, June 1996) was a tortured attempt to develop criteria for the humane and compassionate physician who tries to serve the needs of a patient in unremitting pain. There are three areas that merit comment.The authors dealt with pain medications that might (...) have the undesirable side effect of causing death. They did not mention tolerance, which usually occurs in a patient with chronic pain and which would require exceedingly high doses to be effective. They did not mention barbiturates, which are preferable to opiates in causing death and which are used increasingly by compassionate physicians to answer the pleas of their suffering patients, but for which there is no excuse about alleviating pain. Would the criminal law just call the prescription of a lethal dose of barbiturates a reckless act and require conviction? Fortunately, juries, as the authors point out, do not balance these formulas on the head of a pin. When they see the circumstances under which these doctors do help their patients, they choose to nullify the law and would ignore the suggestions made in this article.The authors refer to the “consent” of the patient. They do not mention that these doctors are operating with more than consent; they are administering these medications because suffering patients are begging them to put them out of their pain and the indignities of the dying process. The article discusses the process as though it were the same as consent to elective surgery. These patients—with AIDS, cancer, and hopeless neurological degeneration—are not simply agreeing to a procedure; they are desperately seeking a way out. If the criminal law were to develop criteria for physician aid in dying, certainly one of them should be the active, witnessed, repeated request of such a patient for a certain, quick, painless, gentle death.The third point is that physicians do not face prosecution when administering no treatment to a patient whose life could be saved with treatment but who chooses not to receive it. This has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court; no criteria for suffering, alternatives, terminality, justifiability, or unbearability are required. The doctor can stand by while the patient dies what may be a protracted, difficult death, but it is within the law. What matters in this situation is the decision of the patient to refuse treatment, and that is absolute. How ironic that the patient who cannot refuse treatment must, with his or her doctor, jump through all these hoops to achieve a peaceful death.One worries that the physician who must balance the risk of “risky pain relief” against the accusation of recklessness will err in the direction of allowing [End Page 103] the patient to bear the pain rather than help with a dose of analgesics that might be considered beyond the stipulated “risk.”Why don’t we just be honest about it? Allow dying or hopelessly ill patients to make the decision about what they want by passing a carefully defined law allowing euthanasia rather than balancing the risk and trying to determine the “purpose” of the physician’s ministrations. We protect some patients from themselves while allowing others almost complete autonomy to make the choice of ending their lives. The authors were right in saying that proponents of rational laws consider this sheer hypocrisy.Faye Girsh, Executive DirectorHemlock Society U.S.A. Denver, COFaye Girsh misconceives our article’s objective as an “attempt to develop criteria” for the humane physician. Our goal in writing the paper was to analyze the current criminal law framework in the hope of sharpening debate and engendering normative critiques. We readily acknowledge tensions in the current legal framework and would support changes in that framework.Copyright © 1997 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Why do people enter devoted relationships when they can continue looking for better partners? The “strategic ignorance” account holds that remaining ignorant about alternative partners is a signal that you are a high‐quality partner. Despite this intuition, the authors show that evolution favors a “look while allowing your partner to look” strategy, unless the costs of being rejected by a looking partner are extremely high. Thus, the origins of love must be found elsewhere.

It is shown that $\operatorname{Con}(ZF)$ implies $\operatorname{Con}(ZFC$ + there exists a Dowker filter on ω2). The problem is also considered on higher cardinals.

The complex chaotic dynamics and multistability of financial system are some important problems in micro- and macroeconomic fields. In this paper, we study the influence of two-delay feedback on the nonlinear dynamics behavior of financial system, considering the linear stability of equilibrium point under the condition of single delay and two delays. The system undergoes Hopf bifurcation near the equilibrium point. The stability and bifurcation directions of Hopf bifurcation are studied by using the normal form method and central manifold theory. (...) The theoretical results are verified by numerical simulation. Furthermore, one feature of the proposed financial chaotic system is that its multistability depends extremely on the memristor initial condition and the system parameters. It is shown that the nonlinear dynamics of financial chaotic system can be significantly changed by changing the values of time delays. (shrink)

The realist interpretations of quantum theory, proposed by de Broglie and by Bohm, are re-examined and their differences, especially concerning many-particle systems and the relativistic regime, are explored. The impact of the recently proposed experiments of Vigier et al. and of Ghose et al. on the debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics is discussed. An indication of how de Broglie and Bohm would account for these experimental results is given.

In his ‘On t and u and what they can do’, Greg Restall presents an apparent problem for a handful of well-known non-classical solutions to paradoxes like the liar. In this article, we argue that there is a problem only if classical logic – or classical-enough logic – is presupposed. 1. Background Many have thought that invoking non-classical logic – in particular, a paracomplete or paraconsistent logic – is the correct response to the liar and related paradoxes. At the most (...) basic level, the target non-classical idea is that some expressions, like ‘all and only the true propositions’, do not behave as we would expect from classical logic. Non-classical theorists argue that the class of all and only the truths is either incomplete or inconsistent: when you truly speak of all and only truths , you're either leaving some truths out, or you're letting some untruths in. Truth, in a slogan, is either gappy or glutty. Non-classicality is not a glib or easy-way-out response to the paradoxes. Innocuous-seeming notions can turn out to be philosophically substantial. Moreover, apparently correct forms of reasoning can turn out to be incorrect. To take a example, a glut theorist must hold that the following argument form is not in general valid. Either p is true or q is true. But p is untrue. So q is true. This argument form may strike our ears as acceptable. But if p is a truth value glut, then the inference fails to preserve truth. According to glut theorists, the inference breaks down in inconsistent contexts: if the subject matter involves gluts, then the inference is to be rejected. And the liar paradox, according to such theorists, shows that truth is exactly the kind of subject matter that yields inconsistency. In the …. (shrink)

In developing artificial intelligence (AI), researchers often benchmark against human performance as a measure of progress. Is this kind of comparison possible for moral cognition? Given that human moral judgment often hinges on intangible properties like “intention” which may have no natural analog in artificial agents, it may prove difficult to design a “like‐for‐like” comparison between the moral behavior of artificial and human agents. What would a measure of moral behavior for both humans and AI look like? We unravel the (...) complexity of this question by discussing examples within reinforcement learning and generative AI, and we examine how the puzzle of evaluating artificial agents' moral cognition remains open for further investigation within cognitive science. (shrink)

According to Wittgenstein, philosophical puzzles are due to deep prejudices about language. In this collection of essays, in honour of Rush Rhees, philosophers investigate the hold such prejudices have on us in a number of closely related areas of philosophical enquiry.